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INTRODUCTION
Should we put all of our high-level radioactive wastes into ordinary
steel barrels that have perhaps 200-year expected containment
capabilities in salt water, and then dump them all into the depths of the
Pacific Ocean and forget about them? Such a policy would free the
billions of dollars spent annually on radioactive waste storage for other
pressing social needs. Despite these benefits, however, most would
regard such a radically present-oriented policy as an egregious violation
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of our ethical obligations to distant future generations. There is broad
consensus that we have ethical obligations to undertake policies that
benefit distant future generations and to eschew policies that impose
significant harms upon them, at least when these choices do not require
excessive current sacrifice relative to the magnitude of long-term
benefits.
However, it proves impossible to articulate a satisfactory rationale
for this position solely on the basis of conventional secular and
consequentialist ethical premises1 ("conventional ethical premises"). The
long-term consequences of radically present-oriented policies and the
ethical questions they present are quite subtle and complicated by what I
call the problem of person-altering consequences. The decision whether
to undertake such a policy should be regarded as an empirical question
and should be made solely on the basis of an assessment of the
consequences for existing persons, and not upon any claimed ethical
obligations to future generations distant enough from us in time for their
members to all have had their genetic identities significantly altered by
those person-altering consequences. We have no ethical obligations to
these distant future generations based on conventional ethical premises
to consider their rights or interests in making environmental or other
policy decisions, because virtually nothing that we could possibly do
would harm any specific future persons, counter-intuitive as this claim
may seem.
It is more difficult to determine whether we have an ethical
obligation of stewardship to the human race viewed in its entirety across
time that exists apart from our ethical obligations to specific persons. Is
the human race a morally significant entity apart from the specific
persons who have lived or will live in the future to whom we do owe
ethical duties?
I conclude that we have no duties to the human race as a whole that
can be grounded on conventional ethical premises apart from our duties
to respect the rights and interests of specific individuals. Since virtually
nothing that we could do would harm the specific future persons that will
comprise distant future generations, we have no ethical obligations to
those distant future generations that can be grounded upon those
1. By the phrase "secular premises" I refer to ethical premises that are derived from
rcflcctions on thc human condition that are agnostic with regard to thc qucstion of the existcncc
of a suprcme supernatural bcing. I will not addrcss in this brief essay the difficult question as to
whether there is a sufficient non-secular basis provided by one or more of the religious traditions
for recognizing an ethical obligation to thc mcmbcrs of distant future gcnerations. By thc phrase
"consequcntialist prcmises" I refer to thc cthical prcmise that actions have ethical rclcvance only
to the extent that they have consequences for the rights or interests of specific persons. I also
will not considcr whcthcr thcre exist any sufficient secular but non-consequentialist grounds for
asserting that wc have any ethical obligations to thc mcmbcrs of distant futurc gcncrations, or to
the human race as a whole, that exist apart from any ethical obligations that can be grounded in
the consequcnccs of our conduct for specific persons. See id.
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premises. Seemingly radically short-sighted policies such as ocean
dumping of high-level radioactive wastes should therefore not be rejected
out of hand as unethical. If we reason from conventional ethical
premises, these policies should instead be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis by the same standard normative criteria that we conventionally
apply to evaluate policies that impact only existing persons.2 The effects
of our choices on the welfare of distant future generations should not,
however, be given any weight in such an analysis except to the extent that
the welfare of existing persons is indirectly affected by those future
consequences. Reasoning from religious premises, however, or from
secular but non-consequentialist premises may lead to the conclusion that
the effects of our choices on distant future generations are of ethical
relevance, depending upon the particular premises embraced. We need to
be more explicit in recognizing that those alternative ethical premises are
a necessary predicate for our having ethical obligations to distant future
generations, since no such obligations to them can be grounded in
conventional ethical premises.
If I am correct, then what are the practical consequences for
environmental policy? It might appear that the significance of recognizing
that we have no ethical obligations to distant future generations that can
be grounded on conventional ethical premises would be completely
overwhelmed by the weight properly given to peoples' beliefs, whether
correct or not, that we do have such obligations, and to their altruistic
inclinations, which are both pervasive and often fervently embraced.
However, it is possible that over time more people will become aware of
and reflect upon the problem of person-altering consequences. If so,
many of them may reach the same conclusions that I have. For at least
some of these people, this realization will likely lead to reduced support
for our making sacrifices on behalf of distant future generations. If so,
then present levels of sacrifice for the sake of distant future generations
can perhaps only be sustained if religious or non-consequentialist secular
ethical premises are embraced.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL-ALTERING CONSEQUENCES
The noted British philosopher Derek Parfit first articulated a simple
yet profound insight, the problem of person-altering consequences, which
calls into serious question whether we have any ethical obligations at all
to distant future generations that can be justified on conventional ethical
2. Thc conventional analytical framework used for guiding policy dccisions is the usC of a
cost-bcncfit analysis of thc various conscqucnccs of thc policy in question, with the impacts of
the policy defined relative to a hypothetical, counterfactual baseline state of affairs, and then
cach impact is valued on thc basis of the willingncss to pay of the affectcd persons, and with
future impacts also discountcd at somc appropriatc discount ratc beforc aggrcgation with
current impacts. See id.
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premises. Stated succinctly, Parfit's insight is that virtually any human
action is sure to have at least minor effects on the timing of some acts of
sexual reproduction, leading to different sperm-egg fertilizations than
would otherwise take place. Over time, this will have exponentially
cascading person-altering consequences as now genetically different
individuals mature and influence the sexual behavior of a broader and
broader circle of people. After a relatively short period of time, in
historical terms, this will lead to the entire human population being
composed of individuals with significantly different genetic endowments
from those persons that would have existed absent that action. In other
words, one rather dramatic consequence of virtually any policy, even one
of rather limited and localized initial impact, is that in the longer term it
will eliminate the coming into existence of many and eventually all
individuals who would otherwise have been born. It will result instead in
the birth of an increasingly and eventually entirely genetically different
group of people.
Parfit's insight is somewhat disturbing, to put it mildly, in that it
makes it impossible to meaningfully assess the merits of environmental
policies that will have long-term consequences by conventional cost-
benefit criteria that do not sharply differentiate between impacts upon
existing persons and impacts upon future persons. Such analyses are
implicitly based upon a covert and completely untenable assumption that
is rarely if ever articulated that the same future persons will exist whether
or not a policy is implemented. They consequently are inadequate
approaches for dealing with the deeper ethical questions that are raised
by the problem of person-altering consequences.
II. THE ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY PERSON-ALTERING CONSEQUENCES
A. Can an Ethical Obligation to Distant Future Generations be
Grounded Upon Con ventional Ethical Premises Regarding the Rights or
Interests of Specific Future Persons?
Let me first examine the question of our ethical obligations to distant
future generations with regard to those specific potential persons who
will now not be born as a result of the person-altering consequences of
the implementation of a particular policy. I will then consider the matter
with regard to those future persons who will be born as a consequence of
that policy.
One possible argument for respecting the rights or interests of
potential persons who due to the person-altering consequences of a
policy will never be born is that they might nevertheless still exist in some
meaningful sense. This is an absurd position and should be rejected.
First, consider the matter of the rights of such never-born potential
persons. If a valuation criterion incorporates even only a minimalist
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concept of rights for potential persons as a constraint upon policy choices
it will at least accord them the right that they not be subjected to policies
that would eliminate their existence altogether, even if it does not
preclude lesser transgressions of their rights. However, a valuation
criterion with even such a limited "right to existence" constraint
appended would rule unacceptable both the decision to implement a
policy with person-altering consequences and the decision not to
implement that policy, because either of these choices would preclude the
birth of a very large group of potential persons. These inconsistent
directives would result not only for radically present-oriented ocean
radioactive waste dumping-type policies but also all other policies that
have person-altering consequences, which probably includes even those
policies with initially only minor and localized impacts.
Once one recognizes the pervasiveness of the person-altering
consequences of policies it is clear that even the minimal right to
existence of potential persons is not a viable policy constraint. The
implementation of virtually any policy will mean that untold trillions of
potential persons who would eventually have been born under one or
another of the very large if not infinite number of possible alternatives to
that policy will now never come into existence. Any ethical principle that
declares that both implementing and not implementing any policy will
each violate the rights of untold trillions of persons would be absurd. This
absurdity demonstrates that the notion that unborn future persons have
rights is based upon a fundamental mistake as to what rights are. Unless
and until people are born they have no rights or even interests.
But what about those future persons who will be born into a perhaps
uncongenial world as a consequence of a policy, and who may well not
approve of some of its impacts upon their welfare? Do they have any
rights or interests that might be violated by, for example, massive
radioactive pollution of the oceans, or by fossil fuel consumption polices
that would allow rampant global warming? The question of whether
these future persons who will be born as a consequence of a radically
present-oriented policy have any rights or interests that place ethical
constraints upon our decision to pursue that policy is more complicated
than was the comparable question for those future persons who will not
be born as a result of the policy.
One would expect that the overwhelming majority of future persons
who would owe their existence to the implementation of a policy would
be very strongly in its favor, even if that policy had some catastrophic
consequences for their well-being. Any policy undertaken, regardless of
its long-term consequences for distant future generations, is ethically self-
validating under conventional ethical premises because it would receive
overwhelming if not unanimous approval from distant future generations
since all of its consequences, good or bad, are necessary conditions of
their existence. So we are under no ethical obligations based on the
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rights or interests of those specific future persons who will be born as a
consequence of a policy since by pursuing it we will not have harmed any
person; they would, if possible, all give their approval to our conduct.
Let me return briefly to the ocean radioactive waste dumping
hypothetical with which I began this essay. While those future persons
born several centuries from now may well suffer very significant burdens
from a decision made today to dump high-level radioactive wastes into
the ocean in barrels that do not provide effective long-term containment,
the substantial resource reallocations that such a policy would allow
would have cascading person-altering consequences that would quickly
be genetically significant and universal in their impact. Those potential
persons who as a result of those consequences would now not be born
would be nonexistent beings who would thus have no rights or interests
that might be implicated by that decision to dump those wastes in the
ocean. These future persons who will be born as a consequence of that
ocean dumping policy would owe their very existence to it. They would
of course much prefer existence without the need to grapple with a
potentially serious radioactive waste problem, were that an option that
they could choose, but the central insight of the problem of person-
altering consequences is that this is not possible. The only choice that
those future persons would be hypothetically be presented with is the
bundled Hobson's Choice of life with the radioactive waste problem or
nonexistence. If they would all choose life then we will not have injured
the rights or interests of any specific person with our ocean waste
dumping, and would of course have benefited existing persons with the
resources saved. So why not do so?
It is thus clear that if a policy that has person-altering consequences
is to be criticized on the basis of conventional ethical premises, criticism
will have to be on some basis other than the argument that its long-term
impacts would violate the rights or interests of future persons. The
challenge is to identify such an alternative basis of a secular,
consequentialist character for justifying ethical obligations to distant
future generations.
B. Is There an Impersonal Basis for Ethical Obligations to Distant
Future Generations?
Do we have any ethical obligations of an impersonal sort that are not
related to the rights or interests of specific persons and that can be
grounded upon conventional ethical premises? The question is only made
difficult because the right answer - no - conflicts with a widely shared
intuition. As discussed above, those future persons born as a consequence
of whatever set of policies that we pursue would likely wholeheartedly
endorse those policies because they are necessary conditions for their
existence. It would make no sense to posit an impersonal ethical principle
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that would give weight to any postulated discontent of those future
persons who will be born with some particular features of their world that
we have bequeathed to them, when any measures that existing persons
could take to change those adverse features would, because of its person-
altering consequences, eliminate those particular future persons'
existence altogether. The only impersonal ethical principle that could be
even a remotely plausible candidate for grounding a duty to future
persons would be a principle that gave some weight to the postulated
consequences for those potential persons who will not now be born, but
who would have been born if that purported impersonal duty to leave to
distant future generations a better world had been discharged.
Such an ethical principle would also have absurd implications. First,
as previously discussed, those potential persons who will now not be born
would be nonexistent beings without rights or interests. This impersonal
principle would thus have to be based upon the results of a policy for
potential persons other than impacts on their rights or interests. No
obvious criteria come to mind. Second, to avoid giving inconsistent
directives, the selected ethical principle would have to privilege one
particular group of potential persons who would be born as the
consequence of one policy over the immense, if not infinite, multitude of
potential persons who would have been born as a result of one or another
of the numerous other possible policy options. It is unclear how this
ethical principle would apply to select this privileged group.
Third, to have any significance for decision-making, the ethical
principle would have to accord sufficient weight to the interests of the
chosen group of potential persons that it privileges so as to outweigh the
massive adverse impact on the rights and interests of the very many
future persons who would have been born if this purported impersonal
duty was not discharged, but whose existence would be precluded by its
discharge. Broad statements to the effect that such a duty runs to the
human race, future generations, society, posterity, or other impersonal
abstraction should not be allowed to obscure the fact that such a duty
would in substance be an obligation to an arbitrarily designated group of
potential persons, chosen from the vast multitudes of potential future
persons who are all without rights or interests, and one that would be
privileged over the rights and interests of those future persons who would
actually be born were this so-called duty not discharged. This is all
absurd; the obvious conclusion is that there are also no impersonal ethical
duties that can be grounded upon conventional ethical premises.
This simple and seemingly unavoidable conclusion is in sharp tension
with the widely shared intuition that we do have some sort of ethical
obligations to distant future generations. We nevertheless must
recognize the pervasiveness of person-altering consequences and that
they completely undercut the idea of there being any ethical obligations
to future generations that can be grounded on conventional ethical
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premises. We must recognize that the choice that we face is either to
continue to assess long-term policy consequences in conventional fashion,
but now solely in terms of their impacts upon the rights or interests of
existing persons, or else to depart from conventional ethical premises and
conduct these assessments in accordance with religious or secular but
non-consequential ethical criteria which may impose ethical obligations
to distant future generations.
In his seminal work, Parfit has taken the position that there are still
sufficient moral reasons for not doing acts that may predictably cause
some future persons to be killed or injured, even when the person-
altering consequences of those acts means that those adversely affected
persons would otherwise never even exist. However, Parfit has candidly
and repeatedly admitted that he was unable to formulate an acceptable
theory that would justify this moral intuition. Numerous other scholars
have also attempted to do so, but none of those efforts are successful in
justifying an impersonal ethical principle that would anchor such
obligations. Those writers generally claim that obligations to future
persons exist and are grounded in an impersonal duty to the human race
as a whole that should be viewed as an entity that meaningfully exists in a
moral sense apart from the specific individuals that comprise it. They are,
however, extraordinarily vague regarding the justifications for and
contours of this claimed duty to the human race, and for the reasons I
have discussed, I remain unconvinced.
C Do We Have Ethical Obligations to the Members of Transitional
Generations?
The person-altering consequences of a policy will obviously take a
period of time to become universal. There will be a transitional period
during which some but not all of the persons born will have genetic
endowments that are different than what they would have been had the
policy not been implemented, and during which some of the persons
whose genetic endowments have been altered will be affected only in
ways so insignificant that their fundamental personal identities are
unaffected. What ethical obligations do current persons have to those
future persons who will be born during this transitional period?
Those future persons born with significantly genetically altered
identities due to the person-altering consequences of a policy should be
regarded in the same manner as are the members of distant future
generations discussed earlier, and are thus similarly not entitled to any
ethical obligations on the part of current persons. On the other hand,
those future persons who are born post-policy with the same (or almost
the same, for practical purposes) genetic endowment they would have
been born with absent the policy should have the same standing to have
their rights and interests considered in deciding whether to implement
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the policy as do current persons. The implementation of the policy would
not be a necessary condition of their existence and identity, and there
would thus be no absurdity involved in considering their probable desires
in the decision-making criterion.
CONCLUSION
The pervasiveness of person-altering consequences has very
significant implications for assessing whether our policy choices are
constrained by ethical obligations to future generations. I have concluded
that except for the rapidly diminishing number of future persons born
during a relatively short transitional period following the implementation
of a policy whose fundamental genetic identity will not be significantly
altered by those consequences, we have no ethical obligations to future
persons that can be grounded on conventional ethical premises of a
secular, consequentialist sort.
This is a troubling conclusion, but a panicked reaction is
unwarranted. To the extent that existing persons do wish to have the
welfare of distant future generations taken into account in policymaking,
whether on religious grounds, or as an act of charity, or on the basis of
secular but non-consequentialist premises, or even on the basis of the
(erroneous) view that ethical obligations to distant future generations can
be derived from conventional ethical premises, my view is that under our
current conventional, non-paternalistic decision-making criteria those
preferences should be given the same weight in making those decisions as
are those persons' other expressed preferences of comparable intensity.
Such preferences are currently strong and pervasive. As a practical
matter, therefore, the insight that ethical obligations to the members of
distant future generations cannot be grounded in conventional ethical
premises that is provided by contemplation of the problem of person-
altering consequences will probably not have immediate impact upon our
deliberations regarding policies with substantial long-term consequences
such as ocean radioactive waste disposal or global warming mitigation
decisions.
However, to the extent that the consensus that present generations
should continue to make sacrifices to benefit distant future generations
wanes in response to greater recognition of the ethical implications of the
pervasiveness of person-altering consequences, our policymakers should
accordingly adjust their decision-making criteria to reflect this changing
attitude. Such adjustments obviously could have important consequences
of one sort or another. They could result, as Parfit fears, in our having a
much greater willingness to take measures that would enhance the
welfare of existing persons without regard to the consequences for distant
future generations. However, the adjustment could instead take the form
of our more explicitly incorporating into our decision-making criteria
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religious or secular but non-consequentialist ethical premises that would
justify our continuing to make some sacrifices on behalf of distant future
generations. Only time will tell.
